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Abstract
In this article I discuss the standard responses given by people for moral 
dilemmas related to life and death, proposing a philosophical model that I call 
“the utilitarian-deontological (deontoutilitarian) model ” to explain how the 
majority of people respond to these dilemmas. I suggest that when people make 
moral judgements they use a system of judgments that combines utilitarian 
and deontological considerations, a system that is primarily deontological, and 
accept that to kill innocent people is wrong. Faced, however, with the necessity 
of having to kill someone to save more people, they will typically say that it  is 
right to do this, unless they have to use their own personal force or have to have 
some kind of personal contact with the person(s) to be sacrifi ced. In these cases 
they will refrain from carrying out the act. However, typically they will agree that  
it is right to  kill the person even using their personal force or having some kind 
of contact with the person if death is inevitable  or in catastrophic situations, in 
which unless you kill one person hundreds of people will die as a consequence. 
The majority of us, however, will come back to their deontological judgment again 
if we are faced for example with a “blackmail” situation, in which someone asks 
us to carry out a killing and if we refuse they threaten to kill everybody. In this 
situation people are outraged with the offer and will typically judge the situation 
in a deontological way again, saying that it is wrong to carry out the killing.
 
Key words: trolley problems, moral dilemmas, deontoutilitarianism, utilitarian-
deontological model.
Resumo
Neste artigo são discutidas as respostas padrão dadas pelas pessoas para dile-
mas morais relacionados a vida e morte, propondo um modelo fi losófi co que 
chamaremos de “modelo deontoutilitarista”. Sugere-se que, quando as pessoas 
julgam moralmente, elas usam um padrão que combina considerações deon-
tológicas e utilitaristas, um sistema que é primeiramente deontológico e aceita 
que é errado matar pessoas inocentes. Confrontados, porém, com a necessi-
dade de matar alguém para salvar mais pessoas, elas tipicamente dirão que é 
correto fazê-lo, a menos que, para isso, elas tenham de usar sua força física ou 
tenham de ter algum tipo de contato pessoal com a(s) pessoa(s) que será(ão) 
sacrifi cada(s). Neste caso, elas não praticarão a ação. Entretanto, elas tipicamente 
responderão que é correto usar a força física ou ter algum contato com a pessoa 
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a ser morta se a morte for inevitável ou em “situações de catástrofe” em que, 
a menos que uma pessoa seja morta, milhares de outras pessoas  irão morrer. 
A maioria de nós, entretanto, voltará a julgar deontologicamente se estiver diante 
de uma “situação de chantagem” em que alguém ordena a outrem que mate 
um terceiro, ameaçando, no caso de que a pessoa se negue a fazê-lo, matar 
um número maior de pessoas. Nestas situações, a maioria das pessoas se sente 
ultrajada com a oferta e, tipicamente, voltará a julgar de modo deontológico, 
afi rmando que seria errado praticar a ação.
Palavras-chave: dilemas do vagão, dilemas morais, deontoutilitarismo, modelo 
deontológico-utilitarista.
Marc Hauser provides an interesting example of how little people have access 
to the principles underlying their moral judgements, even when they think they do 
(Hauser, 2009). He asks his father, a physicist, to give his answer to some of the 
trolley dilemmas. His father says he judged that it is permissible for someone to flip 
a switch diverting a trolley and save 5 people at the cost of saving 1. He also judged 
that it was permissible to push a large person onto the tracks of a train with the 
same purpose and he justified this by saying that the cases were both the same, 
as they reduce the number of people being killed. Hauser, then, asked his father 
if it would be permissible for a doctor to take the life of an innocent person who 
walked into a hospital,  using 5 organs from this person in order to save the lives 
of 5 different people in the hospital who would die unless they had their organs 
transplanted. Hauser’s father judged this act as being impermissible (Hauser, 2009)2. 
Then, realising that his justification for the earlier cases (it saves more lives) did not 
hold up he said that the previous cases were all artificial.
This is a good example, showing that not only people do not have access to the 
moral principles that they use when making moral judgements, but also, it illustrates 
my point in this article, that when people make moral judgements they actually use 
(without having access to them) a system of judgments that combines utilitarian 
and deontological considerations, a system that is primarily deontological, but al-
lows people to breach the deontological rules for utilitarian considerations. There is, 
however, a limit for this, and this limit is set, again, by deontological considerations 
that can be overridden, over again, by utilitarian considerations only in very special 
cases. However, even in these special cases these utilitarian considerations can also be 
overridden once more by deontological considerations under certain circumstances.
What happens when people make judgements about the permissibility of 
killing other human beings in moral dilemmas seems to follow the model below:
(i) People in general judge that killing innocent people is wrong (first deon-
tological constraint).
(ii) However, they are willing to breach this rule in order to maximise the num-
ber of people saved (first utilitarian consideration) (Greene et al., 2001; 
Greene et al., 2004; Koenigs et al., 2007; Nichols and Mallon, 2006).3 
2 See also Harris (1975).
3 All these articles present findings on people’s judgements when they are presented with the choice of whether 
or not to sacrifice one person’s life to save the lives of others as in the trolley dilemma where a train is heading 
directly to kill 5 people on the track, and they will be killed unless you press a switch that diverts the trolley onto 
an alternate set of tracks killing only one person. In this case, people typically say that they would press the switch. 
But in the footbridge dilemma where there is  (as in the other dilemma) a trolley heading directly towards 5 
people but now the only way to save these people is by pushing a stranger off the bridge onto the tracks, killing 
the stranger to save the 5 lives, people typically answer that they would not push the stranger (although in the 
study of Koenigs and others it is shown that in scenarios like the footbridge dilemma  people with damage in 
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex VPMC are  more likely to endorse the proposed action than other groups). 
141
Filosofi a Unisinos, 14(2):139-151, may/aug 2013
Our deontological-utilitarian (deontoutilitarian) minds
(iii) Not everything, however, is morally allowed to be done in order to save 
more lives (a deontological constraint again). What we are actually mor-
ally allowed to do in order to save more lives will depend on personal 
considerations and personal variations. In general when the killing involves 
some kind of physical contact or proximity with the person who will be 
killed, people tend to judge deontologicaly again4 . 
(iv) In a few special cases, for utilitarian reasons, we are allowed to violate 
these deontological constraints. These reasons could be (a) the inevita-
bility of deaths, i.e., when the person will die anyway, in these situation 
people tend to make utilitarian judgements again, and/or (b) when the 
cost/benefit of overcoming the deontological constraint is very high, with 
many lives being saved.5  
(v) We become deontological again if the killing has to be done to satisfy, 
say for example, the outrageous requirements of a perceived evil person 
who blackmails you, threatening to kill more people if you refuse to 
comply and demands that you actively carry out the killing. Here we have 
a conjunction of two factors: (a) blackmail from a perceived evil person 
and (b) the killing involves an act (you have to carry out the killing), 
not an omission (you are not required to leave the person to be killed, 
you are required to kill the person, shooting her/him or even pressing 
a bottom)6.  
Through the supplementary materials for Greene’s “Cognitive Load Selectively 
Interferes with Utilitarian Moral Judgment” (Greene et al., 2008b) we will have 
some important clues on how people make their moral judgements. Here when 
interviewee’s are asked to answer the question if it is appropriated for people to 
kill their despicable boss who makes everyone lives a misery (the architect example) 
only 1% of the people interviewed said that yes, it was appropriated. It was also only 
5% of people who answered that it was appropriated for a pregnant 15 years girl 
to kill her newborn child in order to move on with her life. The very low percentage 
figure of people who answered that it is wrong to kill these people (the boss and 
the baby)  suggests that the greater  majority of us really abide by the rule that  to 
kill innocent people is  generally wrong (let us call this rule 1).
However, people are willing to make exceptions to this rule under certain 
circumstances, for example, when in order to avoid the death of a larger number of 
people you do something that will cause the death of a smaller number. The typical 
example of this is the famous trolley case (already quoted) in which 85% of people 
said it was permissible to flip the switch diverting the trolley saving 5 people at the 
4 For an account on the effect of personal force in people’s judgement on the morality of sacrificing one 
person’s life in order to save other lives, see Greene et al. (2009);  Cushman et al. (2006).  
5 For the influence of the inevitability of death on people’s moral judgement see Moore et al. (2008) and for 
an account of the catastrophe effect where a huge number of people will be lost unless someone or a smaller 
group of people is killed see Nichols and Mallon (2006).
6 Foot (2002) writes: “Suppose, for example that some tyrant should threaten to torture five men if we our-
selves would not torture one. Would it be our duty to do so, supposing we believed him, because this would 
be no different from choosing to rescue five men from his torturers rather than one? If so, anyone who wants 
us to do something we think wrong has only to threaten that otherwise he himself will do something we 
think worse”. Foot (2002, p. 28) continues stating that “In the examples involving the torturing of one man 
or five men the principle seems to be the same as for the last pair. If we are bringing aid we must obviously 
rescue the larger than the smaller group. It does not follow however that we would be justified in inflicting 
the injury or getting a third person to do so, in order to save the five. We may therefore refuse to be forced 
into action by the threats of bad men”. Foot’s conclusion is that the distinction between direct and oblique 
intention plays only a quite subsidiary role in determining what we say in these cases, while the distinction 
between avoiding injury and bringing aid is very important. See also Jim dilemma (Williams, 1973) and the 
modified safari dilemma (Greene et al., 2008b). 
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cost of saving 1.7 The percentage is also high (76%), of people who gave the utili-
tarian answer in the standard fumes dilemma in which you hit a switch in order to 
divert fumes killing one patient in a hospital instead of three (Greene et al.,  2008b)8. 
But not everybody judges that even these kinds of exceptions should be al-
lowed (think back to the 15% of people who answered that it is wrong to divert 
the train or the 24% of people who think that it is wrong to divert the fumes). The 
conditions under which people make exceptions or not for this deontological con-
straint (we shall not kill!) will vary from person to person. However, it does seem 
that there is a pattern for the way that the majority of people will judge. It appears 
that  the majority of us will make exceptions in order to save the most possible 
number of lives (we can verify this by the trolley dilemma and also by the standard 
fumes) but stick with deontology again when killing implies that they may have 
to have some kind of physical contact or proximity with the person to be killed as 
we can see in the footbridge dilemma in which people  are asked to answer if it is 
appropriate to push a man off a bridge in order to save 5 people, and only 12% of 
people give the utilitarian answer in the figures provided by Hauser et al. (2007). In 
Greene’s figures (Greene et al., 2008b) it rises to 21%. Nevertheless, it seems that 
when deaths are inevitable (i.e., when some people in the group or everyone will die 
anyway) and in order to maximise the number of people saved someone has to be 
sacrificed, people tend to make utilitarian judgements again. Here the percentage 
is very high (91%) of people who answered that it is appropriated for a captain to 
kill the injured people in order to provide enough oxygen for the majority to survive, 
in the submarine dilemma (Greene et al., 2008b). We can also see here that there 
is a high percentage of utilitarian answers (71%) in the modified lifeboat dilemma 
(Greene et al., 2008b), in which you throw into the water someone who will not 
survive anyway in order to save everyone’s lives, 60% in the crying baby dilemma 
(Greene et al., 2008b) in which you would have to smother your children in order to 
avoid the enemies soldiers killing the whole group of people including your children 
and even 62% of utilitarian judgements in Sophie’s choice (Greene et al., 2008b). 
It seems that people tend to make utilitarian judgements not only when the 
death is inevitable but also when the cost/benefits in relation to saving lives is high, 
as in the catastrophe case dilemma proposed by Nichols and Mallon (2006). In this 
dilemma a train is transporting an extremely dangerous artificially produced virus 
to a safe disposal site. The virus is profoundly contagious and nearly always leads 
to the death of the victim within a matter of weeks. If the virus were to be released 
into the atmosphere, billions of people would die from it, and there is even a chance 
that it would kill more than half of the human population. In Nichols dilemma, Jo-
nas sees that there is a bomb planted on the tracks and the only way to prevent it 
from exploding is to stop the train, pushing a stranger onto the rails. Nichols then 
found that 68% of the people who were asked to respond to this dilemma said that 
Jonas broke a moral rule, but only 24% said that the action was, after all things 
considered, the wrong thing to do. 
7 According to Hauser et al. (2007), voluntary visitors to the Moral Sense Test website (http:// www.moral.wjh.
harvard.edu) from September 2003 to January 2004 answer that it is morally permissible for someone to divert 
the train (85%) and that it is not permissible to push the man from the bridge (12%). In Greene et al. (2008b) in 
the standard trolley dilemma the reported percentage of those who gave the utilitarian answer decreases to 82%.
8 The standard fumes dilemma is the following: you are a late-night watchman in a hospital and due to an 
accident in the building next door, there are deadly fumes rising up through the hospital’s ventilation system. 
In a certain room of the hospital there are three patients. In another room there is a single patient. If you do 
nothing the fumes will rise up into the room containing the three patients and cause their deaths. The only 
way to avoid the deaths of these patients is to press a switch, which will cause the fumes to bypass the room 
containing the three patients. As a result of doing this the fumes will enter the room containing the single patient, 
causing his death. Is it appropriate for you to hit the switch in order to avoid the deaths of the three patients?
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Nichols explains what is going on. His hypothesis is that even if an action is 
thought to violate a rule, it might also be regarded as acceptable, all things consid-
ered. To judge that an action has violated a rule will be called judgments of “weak 
impermissibility”. To judge that an action was wrong, all things considered, will be 
called judgments of “all-in impermissibility”. According to Nichols and Mallon (2006), 
the findings reinforce the familiar problem posed by catastrophe cases: they indicate 
that most people are not absolutist deontologists. People think that sometimes it 
is all-in permissible to do something that violates a moral rule, including the rule 
that forbids killing innocent people. Nichols also states:
The results also support the idea that there are two partly independent mechanisms 
underlying moral judgment. On the one hand, people have a general capacity to reason 
about how to minimize bad outcomes. On the other hand, people have a body of rules 
proscribing certain actions. This body of rules cannot be subsumed under the capacity 
to reason about how to minimize bad outcomes (Nichols and Mallon, 2006, p. 539).
Nichols proposes that the assessment of all-in impermissibility implicates 
three factors: cost/benefit analysis, checking for rule violations and emotional 
activations. For him in the cases of personal and impersonal trolleys the judge-
ment of all-in impermissibility depends on both the presence of an emotion and 
the judgement that a rule has been violated, but in the absence of emotion the 
cost-benefit analysis typically wins. Emotional activation and thinking that a rule 
has been violated does not, however, necessitate a judgement that an action is 
all-in impermissible, since when the cost-benefit ratio is sufficiently high, people 
tend not to judge the action as all-in impermissible, as it was shown in the ca-
tastrophe dilemma.
Nichols gives an excellent account on how people make moral judgements, but 
the whole story has still to be completed. I suggest that not only is it the high num-
ber of people to be saved (the cost-benefit ratio), but also the inevitability of death 
which are the two main reasons why people alternate between the deontological 
reasoning that it is wrong to kill innocent’s lives in a personal way (requiring some 
kind of proximity or body contact), to a utilitarian one that admits the killing even 
in that more personal way. However, we become deontological once again when 
asked to personally kill a person in order to satisfy a requirement of someone that 
you perceive as being evil. We do not have access to an experiment designed to test 
a proper catastrophic dilemma versus what I will call here the blackmail dilemma. 
However, the modified safari dilemma (Greene et al., 2008b)9 in which a group of 
terrorists promises to save your life and the lives of the children, if you personally 
kill one of the hostages who is being held with you, suggests that the cost-benefit 
utilitarian reasoning can still be overcome, at least in semi-catastrophic cases, by 
deontological considerations. It means that stage 4 (that we have mentioned in 
our model above) can still be overcome by deontological considerations as hypoth-
esised in 5, i.e., if this killing has to be done to satisfy the outrageous requirement 
of a perceived evil person who blackmails you, threatening to kill a larger number 
of people if you refuse to carry out the killing, and not only this, requires your ac-
tion (not merely omission). Nevertheless, why would some people still be willing 
to overcome the utilitarian cost/benefit analyses favouring a deontological norm, 
overcoming stage 4? A possible answer can be given if we admit that we have a 
9 In this dilemma a group of terrorists promises to save your life and the lives of children, if you kill one of the 
hostages who are being kept with you. The percentage of utilitarian answers in the modified safari is only 
22%, according to Greene figures.
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sense of dignity that makes us react emotionally to unfairness, rejecting it10. If this 
is the case, offers to save the lives of a group of people made by someone evil at 
the cost of a third innocent person being forced to carry out the killing to avoid 
the worse outcome, would trigger powerful emotional responses that would make 
people reject the offer. In this case, the response would not be as strong if they 
were not asked to personally kill the innocent person (which makes the majority 
of people still give the utilitarian answer in the Sophie’s choice dilemma [62%]) 
(Greene et al., 2008b) but in combination with the demand that the killing has to 
be carried out by the person who perceives the offer as outrageous, it would make 
people give the deontological response to the dilemma, saying that it is wrong to 
carry out the killing, exactly as it happens in the modified safari dilemma in which 
the percentage of utilitarian judgments is only 22% (Greene et al., 2008b). 
But not everybody judges as the majority of people do, so it will be important 
to understand and classify the various psychological/moral types according to how 
far they are in this chain, namely, how much they are willing to accept utilitarian 
reasons to overcome deontological constraints11. The majority of us are probably 
situated somewhere in the middle. The pure deontological type, are those who, for 
example, think that we are not allowed even to flip the switch diverting the trolley. 
The other extreme is the pure utilitarian types, probably be the 2% quoted by Hauser 
who answered that in a plane crash - the plane crash dilemma - it is appropriated 
for you and another man to sacrifice the life of a wounded boy that you conclude 
has no chance of survival in order to eat him and survive (Greene et al., 2008b). 
In between these two pure deontological and utilitarian types we have all the other 
psychological/moral types. I have to stress that this is at the moment an entirely 
hypothetical philosophical model, and further work must be carried out by moral 
psychologists and neuroscientists in order to test and refine this model, as well as 
to establish exactly the different moral types.  
Greene’s dual process theory of moral 
judgement 
In order to try to understand the mechanisms underlying moral judgements 
in moral dilemmas involving life and death we could benefit from the Studies of 
Greene. Greene and his collaborators developed a dual-process theory of moral 
judgement (Greene et al., 2001; Greene et al., 2004; Greene, 2007; Greene et al. 
2008a; Greene, 2009). In this model deontological judgements are driven by auto-
matic emotional responses, while characteristically utilitarian judgments are driven 
by controlled cognitive processes. 
10 There is no experiment to test catastrophic versus blackmail dilemmas, but fiction could give us some 
important clues about how people would react in these cases. In the film “Batman: the dark knight” the Joker 
put people in two different boats with two detonators , and asked  each group  to detonate the bomb in the 
other boat, saying the  first group  to do this would have their lives saved. The main criminals in Gordon City 
were in one of the groups, but even this group refused the Joker’s offer.    
11 I propose to set up the bases for a scale in terms of judging in a deontological or utilitarian way, a scale that 
ranges from +N to -N, being that the psychological/moral type scoring highest in the positive side  is entirely 
deontological (not accepting any exceptions for the rule one should not kill) and the psychological type scoring 
lowest in the negative side  is entirely utilitarian, accepting that when lives are at stake we should always and 
in any circumstances save the highest possible number of people, even if you have to kill some people to reach 
this result. The more a person is willing to abide by the rule that we should not kill and the more a person is 
not willing to accept any special cases where it is permissible to kill someone to save more people, the higher 
he/she will score as the deontological type, and the more she/he is willing to consider utilitarian reasons to 
break this rule, the higher he/she scores as the utilitarian type.
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According to Greene (2005, p. 350): 
Multiple sources of evidence point toward the existence of at least two relatively 
independent systems that contribute to moral judgment: (i) an affective system that 
(a) has its roots in primate social emotion and behaviour; (b) is selectively damaged 
in psychopaths and certain patients with frontal brain lesions; and (c) is selectively 
triggered by personal moral violations, perceived unfairness, and, more generally, 
socially signifi cant behaviours that existed in our ancestral environment. (ii) a “cog-
nitive” system that (a) is far more developed in humans than in other animals; (b) is 
selectively preserved in the aforementioned lesion patients and psychopaths; and (c) 
is not triggered in a stereotyped way by social stimuli.
For Greene (2008), “cognitive” representations are inherently neutral repre-
sentations, ones that do not automatically trigger particular behavioural responses 
or dispositions, whilst “emotional” representations do have such automatic effects. 
Emotion tends to be associated with parts of the brain, such as the amygdale and 
the medial surfaces of the frontal and parietal lobes. On the other hand, “cognitive” 
processes are especially important for reasoning, planning, manipulating information 
in the working memory, controlling impulses, and “higher executive functions” more 
generally. These cognitive functions tend to be associated with certain parts of the 
brain, primarily the dorsolateral surfaces of the prefrontal cortex and parietal lobes 
(Greene, 2008). Borg defines emotion and reason in a similar way (Borg et al., 2006). 
For him ‘‘emotions’’ are immediate valenced reactions that may or may not be con-
scious. In contrast, ‘‘reason’’ is neither valenced nor immediate insofar as reasoning 
need not incline us toward any specific feeling and combines prior information with 
new beliefs or conclusions and usually comes in the form of cognitive manipulations 
(such as evaluating alternatives) that require working memory. He points out that emo-
tion might still affect, or even be necessary for, reasoning but emotion and reasoning 
remain distinct components in an overall process of decision making.
Greene puts forward the personal/impersonal distinction (Greene et al., 2001; 
Greene et al., 2004). A personal moral violation is one in which (a) the violation 
must be likely to cause serious bodily harm, (b) this harm must befall a particular 
person or a set of persons and (c) the harm must not result from the deflection of 
an existing threat onto a different party. Dilemmas that fail to meet these three 
criteria are classified as impersonal. For Greene, dilemmas such as the standard 
trolley dilemma are impersonal, whilst the footbridge dilemma is personal. Even if 
we do not accept the personal/impersonal distinction12 suggested by Greene, the 
fMRI data in his research shows, at least, that there is a crucial difference between 
the trolley dilemma and the footbridge dilemma, the main difference being that 
the footbridge dilemma engages people’s emotions in a way that the trolley does 
not. Greene proposed that the thought of pushing someone to his death is more 
emotionally salient than the thought of hitting a switch that will produce similar 
consequences. As it was observed through brain images (Greene et al., 2001) the 
contemplation of personal moral dilemmas like the footbridge case produces in-
creased neural activity in brain regions associated with emotional response and social 
cognition (typically the posterior cingulated cortex, the medial prefrontal cortex and 
12 McGuire reanalysed the RT data from the Greene research and claimed (a) that there is no reason to assume 
that emotionally salient moral decisions are processed in a qualitatively different way to those dilemmas that 
are not emotionally salient and (b) that there is no evidence here to support the theory that there are two 
competing moral systems at work (McGuire et al., 2009). Greene (2009) replies to the objection emphasizing 
that the dual-process theory is independent of the personal/impersonal distinction. The basic idea of the reply 
is that even if the distinction personal/impersonal does not hold up, the dual-process theory does.
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the amygdale, as well as the superior temporal sulcus), whilst the contemplation 
of impersonal moral dilemmas such as the trolley case produces relatively greater 
activity in brain regions associated with “higher cognition” (as the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex and the inferior parietal lobe) (Greene, 2005). 
Greene proposes then that the tension between the deontological and 
utilitarian perspectives in moral philosophy reflects a more fundamental tension 
arising from the structure of the human brain (Greene et al., 2004). For him the 
social-emotional responses that we have inherited from our primate ancestors, 
shaped and refined by culture underpin the deontological absolute prohibitions 
whilst the “moral calculus” that defines utilitarianism is made possible by more 
recently evolved structures in the frontal lobes that support abstract thinking and 
high-level cognitive control. He supports his claim by showing that there is evidence 
of increasing emotional-social processing in cases in which deontological intuitions 
are prominent  and greater activity in brain regions associated with cognitive control 
where utilitarian judgements prevail. There was further support for this claim when 
it was found (Greene, 2008) that cognitive load selectively increased RT (response 
time) for utilitarian judgment, yielding the predicted interaction between load and 
judgment type. According to him, in the full sample, load increased the average 
RT for utilitarian judgments by three quarters of a second, but did not increase 
average RT for non-utilitarian judgments at all and the predicted RT effects were 
observed in participants who tend to lean toward utilitarian judgment as well as 
those who do not. These results, concluded Greene, provided direct evidence for 
the hypothesised asymmetry  between utilitarian and non-utilitarian judgments, 
with the former driven by controlled cognitive processes and the latter driven by 
more automatic processes.
On the other hand, the fMRI data obtained by Borg et al. (2006) suggests 
that some deontological responses can be mediated by reason, where other deon-
tological responses can be mediated by emotion. They point out that the individual 
will use varying combinations of cognitive and emotive facilities to address moral 
challenges, but, overall, certain types of moral scenarios are likely to be processed 
in characteristic ways. 
Only further research will give the definitive answer on up to which point 
deontological judgements are essentially emotionally driven and utilitarian judge-
ments are essentially cognitively driven. Putting  aside  for further discussion   how 
these interactions emotion/cognition operate in the brain, it is reasonable to sup-
pose that there is a typical way of processing and solving moral dilemmas involving 
killing which involves a combination of deontological prohibitions and utilitarian 
calculus, although people are not conscious of how they operate (Hauser et al., 
2007). It is not clear whether or not people can switch on and off their deontologi-
cal and utilitarian ways of thinking, switching also on and off their emotional and 
cognitive systems and whether or not their deontological and utilitarian responses 
always match the deontological/emotional and utilitarian/cognitive system. There 
are some indications, however, that people reason in a deontological/utilitarian 
way when responding to these dilemmas, and some typical conditions (as the pos-
sibility of saving more lives. personal force/proximity, cost/benefit, inevitability of 
death, or even outrage and integrity as we will see now) are able to trigger the final 
deontological or utilitarian response. 
Integrity, fairness and the ultimatum-game
The ultimatum game is a designed experiment to test, among other things, 
how people react to unfairness. In this game the proponent (first player) is given 
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a sum of money and he is asked to share the sum with the second player. He can 
choose the amount of money that he will offer to the second player, but if the sec-
ond player refuses the offer, none of them will earn anything. It seems correct to 
deduce from this that if people are interested only in obtaining economical benefits 
the second player would accept all the offers, as something is always better than 
nothing. However, what generally happens is that offers of less than 20% of the 
total amount are frequently rejected (Heinrich, 2000)13. So what can we infer from 
this result? Basically, we can deduce that human beings have a sense of fairness so 
strong that even in situations where we know that we have nothing to loose we 
are not willing to put up with unfairness. The ultimatum game seems to show that 
to a higher or lesser degree human beings are not absolutely determined by the 
desire of obtaining advantages at any cost. 
This behaviour suggesting inequality aversion, in some rudimental forms, 
seems to be shared with other primates as shown by the behaviour of female 
capuchins (De Waal and Brosnan, 2003). In an experiment De Waal showed that 
when these females capuchins received cucumber whilst the other female partici-
pants received grapes (grapes being a much more favoured food than cucumber 
for capuchins), they refused to cooperate or even to eat the food. De Waal  found 
that  the presence of high-value rewards (grapes) reduced the tendency to exchange 
for low-value rewards (cucumber) being the strongest increase of refusal to occur 
if another capuchine received better rewards without any effort (De Waal and 
Brosnan, 2003). De Waal’s hypothesis is that even non human primates are guided 
by species-typical expectations about the way in which one (or others) should be 
treated and how resources should be divided. 
The results of the ultimatum game together with Waals experiments might be 
a strong indication that human beings have evolved to have dignity and this would 
account for some deontological lines that we are not willing to cross, despite the 
price we have to pay for it. This could explain the ultimate deontological barrier, 
specified in step 5 of our model where people refuse to accept being blackmailed, 
and could also explain why we have such a low percentage (22%) of utilitarian an-
swers to the modified safari dilemma (Greene et al., 2008b). Here, personally killing 
an innocent person in order to satisfy the outrageous demands of an evil being is 
perceived as absolutely prohibited, triggering our deontological buttons despite of 
the minimisation of negative consequences that it would bring about (less deaths). 
Accepting the offer would violate our sense of dignity to such an extent that the 
majority of people prefer to decline the offer. There is a clear similarity here with 
the rejection of unfair offers in the ultimatum game. The offer is so clearly perceived 
as outrageous  that despite all utilitarian considerations (save as many lives as you 
can) people prefer to say no. 
Bernard Williams has already proposed a similar dilemma (the Jim Dilemma) 
in order to object to utilitarianism (Williams, 1973). In Williams example Jim got 
lost  whilst on a botanical expedition and found himself in a small town where a 
row of twenty Indians were tied up against the wall and in front of them there were 
several armed men in uniform. The captain in charge (Pedro) explained to Jim that 
the Indians were a random group of inhabitants who, after a recent protest against 
the government, were just about to be killed as a reminder to other protesters of 
why they should not protest. The captain then offers to Jim the privilege of killing 
one of the Indians himself. If Jim accepts the captain will release all the others, but 
if Jim refuses Pedro (the captain) will carry out what he was about to do before Jim 
13 According to Heinrich (2000), the Machiguenga of the Peruvian Amazon are an exception to the rule of 
typically rejecting offers lower than 20%, as they typically accept even very low offers. 
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arrived, and will kill all of the Indians. Williams uses this example to criticise the 
strong notion of negative responsibility that he thinks is attached to consequential-
ism: if I know that if I do X, O1 will eventuate, and if I refrain from doing X, O2 will, 
and that O2 is worse than O1, then I am responsible for O2 (Williams, 1973). In the 
case of Jim, if he refuses to accept the offer and kill only one Indian it will make him 
responsible for all the other deaths. For Williams this is not a good interpretation 
of what is happening. He also uses this example to claim that utilitarianism does 
not leave room for personal integrity.
Williams argues that it is misleading to focus on Jim. The person undoubtedly 
responsible for what happens is Pedro and so we should be thinking about the ef-
fect of Pedro’s project on Jim’s decision. For Williams the utilitarian approach to the 
question “makes Jim a channel between the input of everyone’s projects, including his 
own, and an output of optimistic decision; but this is to neglect the extent to which 
his actions and his decisions have to be seen as the actions and decisions which flow 
from the projects and attitudes with which he is most closely identified. It is thus, in 
the most literal sense, an attack on his integrity” (Williams, 1973, p. 116). 
The view of Williams that somehow Jim’s integrity is being attacked  in this 
dilemma echoes a common feeling that people have, and it can be confirmed in 
the modified safari dilemma (Greene et al., 2008b). It seems that, somehow, com-
mon sense captures the idea of an attack on our integrity in people being used in 
someone’s malign projects. The majority of us refuses to be used by others to carry 
out their evil projects, actively killing innocent people, even if this refusal does not 
fit into a cost/benefit model. There are some acts that attack our dignity so strongly 
that people still refuse to carry them out even knowing that the act will cause the 
least damaging outcome in certain circumstances. The only way to explain why we 
refuse to carry out these acts is appealing for deontological notions of integrity and 
dignity. Here, going beyond Williams, Kant’s considerations on morality, dignity and 
integrity seem to be able to teach us something.
Vindicating Kant  
Hauser (2009) sustains that much of our knowledge of morality is intuitive 
and based on inaccessible principles that guide our judgements, and not based 
on a conscious reflection on these principles. Given the apparent incapacity of the 
average person to supply the reasons for their moral judgements, these would go 
totally against what Kant theorises. But could it really be that, in fact, the studies 
of Hauser, Haidt (2001) and others really contradict Kant’s moral theory? If really 
these studies challenge it, where is the point of collision? 
The studies showing that people make moral decisions without consciously 
reasoning via moral principles does not refute what Kant affirms about the way 
people make their moral judgements. In fact Kant explicitly tells us that to act 
morally, in other words, to act “from the motive of duty” requires that people act 
under reflection, applying the Categorical Imperative: “Hence nothing other than 
the representation of the law in itself, which can of course occur only in a rational 
being, insofar as it and not the hoped-for effect is the determining ground of the 
will, can constitute the preeminent good we call moral, which is already present in 
the person himself who acts in accordance with this representation and need not 
wait upon the effect of his action” (Kant, 1997, p. 14). However, Kant admits that 
many of the human actions are made “in conformity with duty”, i.e., they coincide 
with the duty but they are not carried out from the representation and application 
of the categorical imperative, in other words, they are not “from duty”. Kant tells us 
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that moral actions must be those of the second type, but he has always appeared 
sceptical about the effective existence of these actions, having demonstrated their 
possibility, but never their existence. According to Kant “there is, however, something 
so strange in this idea of the absolute worth of a mere will, in the estimation of 
which no allowance is made for any usefulness, that, despite all the agreement even 
of common understanding with this idea, a suspicion must yet arise that its covert 
basis is perhaps mere high-flown fantasy and that we may have misunderstood 
the purpose of nature in assigning reason to our will as its governor. Therefore, we 
shall put this idea to the test from this point of view” (Kant, 1997, p. 8). Kant puts 
the idea of good will at stake and at no point demonstrates that the pure reason 
determines the will, which means he does not prove that moral actions exist. Kant 
believes that it is absolutely impossible by means of experience to make out with 
complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action otherwise in 
conformity with duty rested simply on moral grounds and on the representation 
of one’s duty. What Kant actually shows us is that pure reason can determine our 
actions, in other words, that we can act morally. He shows that we can act based 
only on the representation of the Categorical Imperative, but, at no time does he 
prove that we actually act based on the representation of the Categorical Impera-
tive, that we act “from duty” (Kant, 1997), that we act morally. 
So, the conclusion seems clear: if Kant does not affirm that people in fact act 
from duty, namely, for pure and simple representation of the categorical imperative, 
then studies which conclude that people do not judge morally from a conscious 
reflection on principles would not affect Kant’s moral view. These studies would 
simply point to the fact that most people do not act “from duty”, something that 
Kant had already suspected.  On the other side, there is another sense, a non-trivial 
sense in which Kant’s moral philosophy might be questioned. In this non-trivial 
sense, the moral philosophy of Kant might be questioned from the evidences that 
the moral judgements made by the majority of people would not correspond even 
to what Kant calls “in conformity with duty”. Bearing this in mind and returning 
to the trolley problem, what would really threaten Kant’s theory is the observation 
that 85% of people think that it is right to divert the train killing one person instead 
of five (Hauser et al., 2007). If that is the case, the basic intuitions of people about 
what is right or wrong would not corroborate, at least not in this case, what the 
categorical imperative prescribes to us, i.e., that people must always be treated as 
an end and never as a means. Killing one person to save five, even being a conse-
quence of a double effect, would be seen as immoral when we apply the categorical 
imperative. The fact that 85% of the people do not agree with this would suggest 
that the agreement between the common sense and the moral theory of Kant14 
might be questioned. So Kant’s philosophy would be open to question not because 
people do not make moral judgements based on principles, but because people’s 
ordinary moral judgements about what is right or wrong does not coincide with 
what the categorical imperative prescribes as being  right or wrong. 
So what are the elements (or element) in the common judgement  that are 
not present in Kant´s theory? My hypothesis here is that it is the utilitarian element. 
In certain situations people think that they are allowed to violate deontological 
prohibitions usually using utilitarian criteria to do so. It seems that we humans are 
willing to maximise welfare and willing to save as many lives as possible. Nevertheless, 
there is a limit up to which we are prepared to go. If, as it seems to be , there is a 
14 In the first section of GM Kant (1997) establishes that the layman, without any philosophical education, 
knows already what is right or wrong. There is, then, an agreement between the categorical imperative and 
common reason, there is an agreement between the ordinary moral knowledge and philosophical knowledge.
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deontological-utilitarian way in which our minds work when we have to judge and 
make our moral decisions, it would be worthwhile to follow this path to investigate 
it further. If people use in general deontological criteria to make moral judgements, 
but replace these deontological criteria for utilitarian ones in some circumstances 
and vice-versa, it would be very promising to establish a better dialogue between 
deontology and utilitarianism, between Kant and Mill, in order to decipher our 
deontological-utilitarian (deontoutilitarian) minds.
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